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Abstract 
 
We construct a theory of forward guidance in economic policy making in order to provide a 
framework to explain the role and strategic advantages of including forward guidance as an 
explicit part of policy design. We do this by setting up a general policy problem in which 
forward guidance plays a role, and then examine the consequences for performance when 
that guidance is withdrawn. Following Acocella et al. (2013), who revisit the classical 
theory of economic policy in a world with rational expectations, we show that forward 
guidance provides enhanced controllability and stabilizability – especially where such 
properties may not otherwise be available. As a bi-product we find that forward guidance 
limits the scope and incentives for time inconsistent behavior in an economy whose policy 
goals are ultimately reachable. It also adds to the credibility of a set of policies therefore. 
 
JEL Classifications: E42, E58, E61, E63 
Keywords: Managing Expectations, Stabilizability, Dynamic Controllability, Time 
Consistency. 
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1. Introduction 
John Williams, President of the San Francisco Federal Reserve and member of the Fed’s 
Open Market Committee, has argued that forward guidance and large scale asset purchases 
(popularly known as Quantitative Easing) are now the leading and most important forms of 
unconventional monetary policy (Williams, 2011). Both techniques were used extensively 
to engineer a recovery from the Great Financial Crisis of 2008-12, in the United States and 
elsewhere.
1
 
But, whereas Quantitative Easing has been studied in some detail
2
 and is comparatively 
well understood in terms of how it is supposed to work, if not in terms of how large an 
impact it has had in practice, forward guidance has been equally widely used but with little 
understanding of how and in what circumstances it can work successfully, what the 
drawbacks might be, and what its impact might be. In short, we lack a proper analysis of 
the strategic value of forward guidance as a tool of monetary policy – both in general and 
in difficult circumstances. 
Forward guidance may be defined as announcements made about the future stance of policy 
with the intention of influencing or managing expectations of future policy interventions, 
and hence the expected path of future outcomes for the economy.
3
 It may be unconditional 
and/or indefinite (“interest rates will remain low for a considerable period of time”); or 
conditional (“interest rates will remain low until unemployment falls below 6.5%”) or time 
dependent (“for two years”).4 It can be applied to achieve either controllability (the 
intention to achieve certain target values at a specified date in the future), or stabilizability 
(the ability to stabilize the economy about a certain path, be it one which leads to the 
desired target values or a continuation of the current policies, whatever shocks may yet 
emerge). 
                                                 
1
 Prominent examples, in the recent past, have been the UK, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Sweden. 
2
 Williams (2011), Ugai (2007), Gagnon et al.(2011), Joyce et al. (2012), and referencese therein. 
3
 We do not consider forward guidance in the form of announcements made about the policy maker’s 
projections on the future path of the economy here, although that is always possible and is indeed implied by 
the projections of the policy instruments – given access to a model of the economy and a matching 
information set. 
4
 See Acocella and Hughes Hallett (2014). 
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Forward guidance is therefore designed to make the private sector’s expectations consistent 
with the policy intentions of the central bank or government with respect to interest rates, 
growth and investment – especially at the zero lower bound (Coeuré, 2013). There is some 
evidence that it has reduced the volatility of expectations (Coeuré 2013; Filardo and 
Hofmann 2014). On that view, the Governor of the Bank of Canada has argued that forward 
guidance is best used for stabilization, especially at the zero lower bound.
5
 
The literature on forward guidance is, at this point, rather limited and restricted to a few 
specific problems or circumstances. A natural concern is whether forward guidance 
statements have had a perceptible impact on expectations. Kool and Thornton (2012) argue 
that they have not, at least not in the context of monetary policy in four leading OECD 
economies. On the other side, Campbell et al. (2012) argue that they did in the US when 
viewed over a longer sample period (1990-2011). Then again, Del Negro et al. (2013) 
suggest that our standard models often overestimate the size of these impacts. Obviously 
the jury is still out on that question.  
Unsurprisingly given recent history, much of the theoretical work has been done in the 
context of interest rates being stuck at their zero lower bound. Here, for example, Gavin et 
al. (2013) find forward guidance announcements have the power to lower interest rates, 
prompting consumption and output to recover, if private sector expectations adjust – more 
so, the longer the horizon. However, in an important qualification, Levin et al. (2010) warn 
that the stability of the economy may be at risk. They find that, given moderate negative 
shocks, forward guidance can be used to stabilize the system, but conjecture that large 
negative shocks (such as would appear in a big recession) will overwhelm the forward 
guidance effects and leave us unable to stabilize the economy. But whether that is a result 
of large shocks, or of insufficiently responsive policies or inadequately chosen forward 
guidance, is a moot point. These results prompt another line of thought: that the 
effectiveness of forward guidance may depend on the form of guidance offered – 
specifically whether it is Delphic (the expectations offered are in terms of outcomes; such 
as would be the case when trying to escape a serious recession), or Odyssean (the 
                                                 
5
 Stephen Poloz, interview in the Financial Times, 15 October 2014. 
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expectations offered are in terms of a policy rule, or contingency plans defining how the 
authorities will react to certain conditions).
6
 This mirrors the unconditional vs. conditional 
forward guidance, with an exit strategy, distinction made in Acocella and Hughes Hallett 
(2014). 
In trying to construct a theory of forward guidance, any formal analysis must fit within a 
general theory of policy announcements (Hughes Hallett and others 2012a,b; Acocella et al. 
2014)
7
. Any such theory needs an understanding of the strategic advantages offered by 
forward guidance, its role in the policy arsenal, its value in terms of overall economic 
performance, and whether the expectations generated would be sustained or dissipated by 
time inconsistent revisions. That is the subject of this paper.  
Starting from the framework in Acocella et al. (2013), we proceed by examining the 
advantages of policy rules which contain forward guidance, and then explore what is lost if 
those guidance terms are removed. Section 2 presents a generic economic model with 
rational expectations. Section 3 deals with conditions for controllability of this model, 
while Section 4 derives the corresponding conditions for stabilizability. Section 5 illustrates 
these concepts using two simple examples to explain the role of forward guidance; and 
underline the value of providing forward guidance in a policy rule where the private sector 
has, and reacts to, rational expectations of future outcomes. This leads to conclusions rather 
different from those appearing elsewhere in the existing literature (Section 6). 
2. Economic Models with Forward Looking Expectations 
Without loss of generality, we can write the generic linear RE model in its reduced form for 
a single policy authority, as follows:  
(1) 1 1|t t t t t ty Ay Bu Cy v        for t = 1,…,T. 
where  1| 1 |t t t ty E y    denotes the mathematical expectation of 1ty   conditional on t  
(a common information set available to all agents at t) and 𝑢𝑡 is a vector of m control 
                                                 
6
 For this distinction, see Raskin (2013) and Contessi and Li (2013), respectively. 
7
 See Amato et al. (2002), or Brand et al. (2010) for further evidence.  
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variables in the hands of the policymakers. The matrices A, C and B are constant and of 
order S, S, and S m, respectively, and have at least some elements which are nonzero. In 
this representation, 𝑦0 is a known initial condition, and 1|1Ty   is some known, assumed or 
expected terminal condition (most probably one that describes the economic system’s long 
run equilibrium state);
8
 and both are part of each information set t. Note that the values of 
𝑢𝑡 are not part of t since they are determined by policymakers.  
Finally tv  is a vector of exogenous shocks or other influences on 𝑦𝑡 , with known mean but 
which comes from an unspecified probability distribution. Note also that the policy 
authority may have q ≤ S explicit targets, but that the m instruments are assumed to be 
linearly independent. Thus, 𝑦 ∈ 𝑅𝑆 and 𝑢 ∈ 𝑅𝑚. 
This model can now be solved from the perspective of any particular period, say t = 1, by 
putting it into its final form conditional on the information available in that period: 
(2)    
1
1|1 1|1 1|1 0
|1 |1 |1 1|1
00 . 0 0 . . 0
: . . .. . 0 . . 0
: . . .0 . 0 . . . .
: . . 0. . . . . 0 .
0 . 0 0 . . 0 0T T T T
y u vI C B Ay
A I
C
y u v CyA I B


           
                    
             
          
          
                    
 
 
  
   
  
  
   
 
Although equation (1) has been solved from the point of view of Ω1, it is understood that it 
could be derived for each Ωt, t = 1,...,T, in turn, where  |  j t t jy E y  if j t , but |   j t jy y  
if j t ; similarly for u and v.  
The equation to which (2) is the solution makes it clear that neither policymakers, nor the 
private sector are required to make expectation errors for the policies to work as planned. In 
fact, equation (3) below shows just the opposite: those expectations are exactly consistent 
with what the private sector expects the outcomes to be. It then only remains to discover if 
                                                 
8
 There is no indeterminacy problem here. The dynamic conditions which guarantee the existence of a 
solution are automatically satisfied, given any particular information set, if the inverse in (2) exists – which 
we show to be true below. Given that inverse, Hughes Hallett and Fisher (1988) show that the saddle point 
property (that the system has the correct number of stable and unstable roots to ensure a solution, Blanchard 
and Khan (1980)) is satisfied. One implication is that it no longer matters what the value of the terminal 
condition is (or if none is specified) so long as the policy horizon is far enough away (T  ). Indeterminacy 
may however follow for smaller values of T if 𝑦𝑇+1/1 cannot be specified. 

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it is possible to shift expectations in such a way that the economy’s outcomes can reach 
certain specified target values at certain points of time. 
It is easy to show that this final form solution always exists since the inverse matrix in (2) 
is well defined provided the matrix product AC does not contain a unit root (Hughes Hallett 
et al, 2012b).  
3. Controllability 
We can now write the model in final form in the following way: 
(3) 
1|1 1|1 1|111 1
|1 |1 |11
. . .
. . .. . .
. . .. . .
. . .. . .
. . .
T
T T TT TT
y u bR R
y u bR R
      
      
      
       
      
      
            
, or y Ru b   
where
1( ),TR T I B
      1 1 0 1|1( | ) : 0 0 :T Tb T E v A y C y      , and   denotes a 
Kronecker product. In this representation, each , |1 |1/t j t jR y u    is an Sm matrix of policy 
multipliers for t, j = 1,…,T. Notice that 0, jtR  even if t < j. Hence equation (3) implies 
that jtR ,  is a matrix of conventional policy multipliers between |1ty  and |1ju , with a delay of 
t–j between implementation and realization if t≥j. But if t< j, then 0, jtR  represents a 
matrix of anticipatory effects, on |1ty , of an announced or anticipated policy change |1ju  at 
some point in the future. 
Multi-period static controllability 
Static controllability defines the set of conditions which must hold if an arbitrary set of 
target values can be achieved for the endogenous variables ty  in each period. Define those 
target values to be |1ty ; and y the corresponding stacked vector of those desired values 
across time periods.  
9 
 
Static controllability, meaning the ability to reach desired values for the targets in each 
period, evidently requires the matrix R in (3) to possess an inverse:
9
 
(4)  
1( )u R y b    
where y, u and b are all understood to be expectations conditioned on the current 
information set t , including the terminal condition, as specified in equation (3). Hence: 
Theorem 1 (static controllability under REs). Under REs, static controllability by a single 
player, as in any conventional backwards looking model, requires as many independent 
policy instruments as there are target variables in each time period.  
Proof. See Hughes Hallett et al. (2012b). ■ 
Multi-period dynamic controllability 
A model is said to be dynamically controllable if a sequence of instrument values 1,..., tu u  
can be found that will reach any arbitrary values, ty , for the target variables in period t (in 
expectation) given an arbitrary starting point .0y  Starting from period 1, dynamic 
controllability therefore requires a sequence of intended instrument values, 1|1 |1,....., Tu u , that 
guarantee 
|1ty is reached in period t. Given an initial state 0y  and terminal condition 1|1Ty  , 
this is possible only if the sequence of policy multipliers and anticipatory effects in the t-th 
row block of (3), [ Ttt RR ,1, ..... ], is of full rank. That is, if ,1 ,r[ .... ]t t TR R S . 
Theorem 2 (sufficient conditions for dynamic controllability with REs). The economy 
represent-ed here by (1) is dynamically controllable over the sub-interval (1, t), when T ≥S 
and when t<T, if ,1 ,r[ .... ] .t t SR R S  
Proof. See Hughes Hallett et al. (2012b). ■ 
                                                 
9
 For convenience we have assumed that the number of instruments and targets does not vary over time.  
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Comment 1. It is important to see why time inconsistency will not appear here. 
Controllability at period t means that, barring unforeseen shocks, the policymaker will be 
able to reach his desired values for yt in expectation. Hence, yt|t= yt|1= ty  are fixed or at 
least known quantities. But y1|t = y1|1 is fixed by history; and u1|t=u1|1 likewise. It is then 
easy to see that, if nothing else changes, ut|t= ut|1. The policymaker is of course free to set 
ut|t≠ ut|1. But he would never do so because ty  is his first best value and is reachable given 
no information changes or unforeseen shocks. Policy makers have no incentive, still less a 
strategic interest, in choosing to make themselves worse off than they need to be.  
Could time inconsistency not emerge as new shocks appear over time? Comment 1 says 
that time inconsistency would never appear, and that will remain true unless: a) there are 
too few instruments to control the targets in any time period (m<S: static controllability 
doesn’t apply at any t); and b) there are too few time periods between the current period, 
and the time at which the target values are to be achieved, for the available instruments to 
reach the number of targets remaining (S/m<t where t is the date by which the desired 
targets are to be attained: the rank condition for dynamic controllability no longer applies).  
Thus comment 1 remains true for all time periods. However, if t remains fixed, the 
possibility of those conditions holding becomes larger as we go further into the policy 
period (i.e as t-tc gets smaller, where tc is the current period). But if that happens when the 
policy revisions are driven by shocks or new information, they are not an example of time 
inconsistency, but of contingency planning. No rational policymaker would fail to react to 
new information to correct his policy settings when there is new information or the old 
information was wrong. But we don’t say they are being time inconsistent when they do 
that. It is just a normal feature of any feedback regime, including those without rational 
expectations and hence no chance of time inconsistent behavior.  
4. Stabilizability under Rational Expectations  
We can apply the reasoning underlying Theorem 2 to show that any economy can be 
stabilized to an arbitrary degree under rational, forward looking expectations if it is also 
dynamically controllable. An arbitrary degree of stabilization means that policy rules can 
11 
 
be found to make the economy follow an arbitrarily stable path, based on an arbitrary set of 
eigenvalues, such that it returns to the original path following a shock (Wonham, 1974).
10
 
 
Theorem 3 (stabilizability and REs). For any economy represented by (1), with arbitrary 
coefficient matrices A, B and C, we can always find a series of dynamic forward-looking 
policy rules, |1 1|1 |1
1
T
t tj j t
j
u K y k

  ,11 such that the controlled economy is stabilizable up to 
an arbitrary set of eigenvalues, if that economy is dynamically controllable as defined in 
Theorem 2.
 
 
Proof
12
: Equation (1), with arbitrary coefficient matrices A, B and C, can be reduced to its 
final form (2). Substituting the policy rule |1 1|1 |1
1
T
t tj j t
j
u K y k

   for each t = 1,…,T shows 
that the controlled economy will behave as: 
(5) 
1|1 0 1|11,1 1,2 1,11 1
1|12,1
1,
|1 1|1 |1,1 , 1 ,1
. .. . .
. .. .. . .
. . .. . .. . .
. . .. .. . .
. .. . .
TT
T T
T T TT T T T TT TT
y y cK K KR R
yK
K
y y cK K KR R


       
       
       
        
       
       
       
        
 
where 
0|1 0y y  and 
1
|1 |1 |1t t T tc b T Bk
   (
|1tb  was defined in (3)). Rewriting (5), we now have 
(6)          1t ty RKy c   
where ty  is the stacked vector on the left of (5).  
For an economy to be stabilizable at t, it must possess the property that it would return to 
the initially expected path, whatever the initial conditions and shocks experienced up to that 
point, given no further shocks or changes in expectations appear (Wonham, 1974). This 
property will exist if the iteration matrix, RK, has its roots inside the unit circle. But we can 
go further. Any particular |1ty  
will follow an arbitrarily stable path if we can pick tTt KK .....1  
to generate an arbitrary set of eigenvalues for that matrix for each t. Suppose we want to 
                                                 
10
 Theorem 3 gives the REs analogue of the standard theorem for backward looking, physical systems. 
11
 Note that this rule, when used in period t<T, employs actions and anticipated actions up to period T. 
12
 Adapted from Acocella et al. (2013, Chapter 12). 
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choose iteration matrix 1D Z Z   , where   is a diagonal matrix of chosen eigenvalues, 
and Z is a matrix of corresponding eigenvectors. Then, as long as T>S and the matrix R has 
full rank ST (i.e., m≥S, so that static controllability applies), we can calculate the required K 
from 1 1K R Z Z   . But if m<S and dynamic controllability applies (as in the theorem), 
then we can use a generalized left-inverse instead: 1K R Z Z   , with  
1
R R R R
    as 
one obvious possibility. This generalized inverse always exists, given dynamic 
controllability, since R R  has full rank with r[R]= mT by Sylvester’s inequality. To see 
this, recall  1TR T I B
   where 1TT

 is a square ST×ST matrix of full rank and  I B  is 
a block diagonal matrix with rank mT. Hence, by Sylvester’s inequality, r[R]≥ ST+mTST 
= mT. But if m<S, then  r I B  cannot be greater than mT by definition. Hence r[R]=mT, 
which means that  
1
R R

 exists and that R  is always available. ■ 
Comment 2. Note that the policy rules described in Theorem 3 are both forward and 
backward looking in that they react to expected future developments, including to the 
effects of these rules applied in the future, and to feedback from past outcomes (past 
“failures”) – in exactly the same way as the private agents in the economy have been 
assumed to do. 
Comment 3. Thus we can infer that a RE model which is dynamically controllable at t = 1 
in the sense of Theorem 2, is also stabilizable from t = 1. Hence Theorem 3 generalizes on 
Wonham’s theorem, where stabilizability can be achieved for the first time only in period S. 
However it is not generally possible to dispense with the feed-forward part of the policy 
rule for the obvious reason that it has to control both the feed-forward and feedback 
behavior of private agents.  
Comment 4. The key lesson therefore is that, in models with forward looking behavior, the 
closed loop (as opposed to feedback) characteristics of our policy rules are of special 
importance. Closed loop means reacting to changes in expectations of future events as they 
appear, in addition to past outcomes as they deviate from plan.  
13 
 
Comment 5. Theorem 3 delivers a different result from Levin et al. (2010), who conjecture 
(but do not prove) that forward guidance terms in the policy rule can be used to stabilize an 
economy in the face of small shocks, but not large shocks. But they do not allow 
policymakers freedom to choose the policy rules (and hence the policies) needed to 
stabilize the economy. Theorem 3 shows that such policy rules can always be so chosen if 
there are no further constraints. We examine this difference in greater detail elsewhere 
(Hughes Hallett and Acocella, 2014) and show that the capacity to stabilize the economy 
depends not on the size or direction of the shocks; but on the choice of parameters in the 
policy rule. Offsetting large shocks needs a stronger rule and hence more suitable forward 
guidance. Large negative shocks may prevent the Taylor principle being applied in some 
instances, but these are mostly cases close to the zero lower bound where that principle 
would be unsuitable anyway. 
5. An Illustration: Stabilizability, with and without forward looking policies. 
We now construct two simple examples of this stabilizability result to illustrate the 
importance of using forward looking policies and forward guidance given forward looking 
behavior by the private sector. These examples are constructed to explain a paper by 
Cochrane (2011) which claims that the Taylor rule in a New Keynesian model will produce 
results that are typically unstable. The claim is correct, but not for the reason offered. The 
correct reason is, no rational policymaker would ever attempt to use a backward looking 
policy rule to manage an economy with forward looking behavior or anticipations. Forward 
guidance is needed as well. 
For the purposes of illustration, consider a one equation RE model with dynamics: 
(7)      1 1
e
t t t t ty ay by cx       
Such a model can be derived from a conventional New Keynesian model of the type used 
by Mishkin (2002), say, to assess the ability of Taylor rules to control inflation and the 
output gap. That is, we can start from: 
(8)       1 11t t t t t t tE z f v               
14 
 
(9)       1 1t t t t t t t tz E z i E f           
where (80) is an aggregate supply equation with dynamics, πt is the rate of inflation, zt the 
output gap; ft is the stance of fiscal policy,
13
 it the interest rate (monetary policy instrument), 
and vt and ηt are random shocks. Eliminating zt between (8) and (9) yields: 
(10)            1 1 11t t t t t t t tE i E                
where  1t t t t t tE z f           represents a composite term of exogenous 
“shocks”. This definition of εt also involves an approximation in that 1t tE z  should, strictly 
speaking, be an endogenous (rational) expectation of the output gap. Classifying it as part 
of the composite error term is to recognize the reality that the private sector typically does 
not have full REs for the output gap; or cannot measure them accurately; or that the private 
sector is no more able to separate cyclical from structural changes in the trend of output 
than can the policymakers – the delay needed for the data to do so accurately being up to 4 
years.
14
 Agents therefore typically use a simple forecasting or extrapolation device for 
1t tE z instead. Given that, we can recast (10) as a particular case of (7) with a  ;
 1b      ; and c   . In this case, xt is the policy instrument (interest rate); and 
yt is the policy target (inflation). 
We can now investigate the ability to stabilize, based on our notion of controllability, using 
Theorem 3. Consider now two different decision rules for managing (7):  
a) with no forward looking elements, 
(11)        1 1 2t tx k y k  ; and 
b) with an added forward looking element, 
(12)         𝑥𝑡 = 𝑘1𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝑑𝑦𝑡+1
𝑒 + 𝑘2 say.   
                                                 
13
 Many New Keynesian models specify marginal costs, mct, as the push factor in inflation, in place of ft. In 
this case (10) would have ft+mct in t in place of the (+)ft term. This alternative specification would 
lead to a model of identical form to that specified here. 
14
 See Hughes Hallett, Kattai and Lewis (2012). 
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We substitute (11) or (12) into (7) to see the behavior of the economy under control in each 
case: 
(13)         𝑦𝑡 = (𝑎 + 𝑐𝑘1) + 𝑏𝑦𝑡+1
𝑒 + 𝜀𝑡
∗; and  
(14)          𝑦𝑡 = (𝑎 + 𝑐𝑘1)𝑦𝑡−1 + (𝑏 + 𝑐𝑑)𝑦𝑡+1
𝑒 + 𝜀𝑡
∗ 
respectively, where 𝜀𝑡 
∗ = 𝜀𝑡 + 𝑐𝑘2. Renormalizing (13) and (14) on their lead terms, then 
taking expectations conditional on information available in period t, and dropping the 
superscript “e” for simplicity, leaves us with two alternative models to be stabilized: 
(15)         1 1 1 *1 1 1t t t ty b y b a ck y b 
  
      
(16)               
1 1 1 *
1 1 1t t t ty b cd y b cd a ck y b cd 
  
         
It is already obvious that (15) presents us with only one opportunity, via the choice of 𝑘1, to 
choose the coefficients and thus the roots of the economy under control. Yet there are two 
roots. In fact, it will not be possible to stabilize this economy with a simple feedback rule at 
all, unless b>1, let alone to do so up to an arbitrary pair of eigenvalues.  
Equation (16), by contrast, gives us the opportunity to choose two coefficients, and hence 
both characteristic roots in the economy under control, given our freedom to choose both 
𝑘1 and d. Hence, this system is stabilizable, and stabilizable up to an arbitrary set of 
eigenvalues.  
We demonstrate these two claims as follows. The roots of equation (15) are: 
(17)             
1
21
1,2 1
1
1 1 4
2
b b a ck         
We can therefore only choose to have real roots (by choosing k1>(14ab)/4ac, if b,c>0); 
or to have the product of the roots less than one (by setting k1<(ba)/c in under the same 
conditions). But we cannot choose the size of the roots individually. In fact to minimize the 
larger of the two, the best we can do is to set 𝑘1= a/c. That will give us  11,2 0,b  ; 
which means that we can stabilize the system with a simple feedback rule, but only if the 
system is already stable (b>1). This case is not of much interest, therefore 
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Notice that stabilizability here is determined by the coefficients of the model – not by the 
policy rule. So it is correct to say that a forward looking New Keynesian model may not be 
stabilized by a Taylor rule. But if instability follows, the fault lies not with the rule, but 
with the model. Taylor rules do not, in themselves, destabilize the economy. 
By contrast, if we use a forward looking rule like (12), the controlled economy will behave 
as in equation (16). The roots of this system are: 
(18)           𝜆1,2 =
1
2
(𝑏 + 𝑐𝑑)−1{1 ± [1 + 4(𝑏 + 𝑐𝑑)(𝑎 + 𝑐𝑘1)]
1/2} 
which can be set to be arbitrarily close to zero – for example, by selecting i) /d b c     
where 1  ; and ii) 𝑘1= a/c. The system’s roots are then    1 1 111,2 2 0,        , 
both of which lie within the unit circle. Stability is therefore assured in all possible 
circumstances. Indeed these roots are arbitrarily small if   is made large enough. In this 
case, therefore, an arbitrary degree of stability can be conferred on any model, including 
those that were unstable to start with. Moreover, the stabilization is done by the rule, not 
the model. The key difference, in this case, is that the forward looking component in the 
rule, d, supplies the roots of the stabilized economy. 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper we have outlined a general theory of forward guidance for policymaking. We 
have used entirely conventional assumptions about an economy under rational expectations, 
on the model used to represent it, and on the way private sector expectations are formed 
and can be exploited by the policymaker. We have thus provided a framework to explain 
the role and strategic advantages of including forward guidance as an explicit policy tool, 
and to underline the adverse consequences for performance when that guidance is 
withdrawn. What this paper shows is that forward guidance is an essential component of 
any policy rule in an economy which is subject to forward looking anticipations of future 
behavior.  
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i) Given the rank condition in theorem 2, forward guidance is a necessary condition to 
secure stabilizability and/or controllability (the ability to stabilize around and ultimately 
reach specified values for the target variables).  
ii) An economy that is controllable for a certain set of target variables and time horizon, is 
also stabilizable for those targets and time horizon. And if it is stabilizable, it is 
controllable. So it is only necessary to test the rank condition in theorem 2 before applying 
forward guidance. 
iii) Without forward guidance that provides the private sector with information about the 
policy maker’s future intentions, the economy may not be stabilizable; and will in general 
not be controllable with respect to any given target values either. 
iv) The stabilizability and controllability properties conferred by forward guidance take 
effect immediately, from period t=1, rather than after t periods delay as would be the case 
in an economy without anticipations effects.  
v) Forward guidance therefore accelerates the required policy impacts. It offers the 
policymaker the opportunity to control the economy from any date, as the private sector 
anticipates his future behavior and knows that he can control the economy. 
vi) Time inconsistency is not a problem under forward guidance unless there are 
insufficient policy instruments and policymakers are impatient (have very short horizons). 
Specifically there is no reason to suppose that policymakers acting in their own interest will 
show time inconsistent behavior unless both m<S and S/m<t, where t is the date by which 
stability or the desired target values are to be attained. 
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